The increase in availability of spatial data and the technological advances to handle such data allow for subsequent improvements in our ability to assess risk in a spatial setting. We provide a generic framework for quantitative risk assessments of disease introduction that capitalizes on these new data. It can be adopted across multiple spa-
Targeting prevention and control spatially, in this manner, can save time, money and resources.
Whilst there are clear outlines and recommendations on how to perform risk assessment for initial infections and spread of infectious diseases generally, which include quantifying entry, exposure and consequence assessments (Murray, 2004) , there is, however, no generic framework for performing quantitative risk assessments in a spatial setting. A framework allows for standardization across different countries and organizations to facilitate policy and decision-making. In this paper, we outline a proposed generic framework for completing spatial quantitative risk assessments for risk of infection. The defining feature of the framework will be its emphasis on disease introductions from one area to another. However, the aim is for the framework to be generic across the type of pathogen, method of transmission, species of host(s) and spatial resolutions. To outline what the framework aims to achieve, we formulate the risk question as: "What is the risk of infection of a pathogen in Area B given the presence of that pathogen in Area A?" It thus focuses on initial infection by means of introduction.
We introduce the generic framework and undertake the risk assessment for one pathway, namely the risk of initial infection by means of registered movement of hosts, using a case study. In the case of livestock this implies a focus on trade but human movement via airplanes or other ticketed travel between countries is also applicable. Calculation of the risk of infection due to unregistered movement of hosts across borders, such as vectors, wild birds or illegal trade, is not considered in our case study. Through this case study we highlight the degrees of detail possible in the risk assessments using our framework when the risk assessor has access to data at a country level only, country-level data with some regional data and lastly detailed individual farm-level data.
Lumpy skin disease (LSD) is used as the case study for assessing the risk of infection by legal trade. LSD virus, which affects cattle and buffalo, is in the Capripoxvirus genus along with sheeppox and goatpox. It causes nodules on the skin, mucus membranes and internal organs; reduction in milk production; fever; oedema; and sometimes death (Davies, 1991; Tuppurainen & Oura, 2012) . Mortality is usually low (<10% Kumar (2011) ), but it can cause significant economic losses and hence the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) classifies LSD as a notifiable disease. Mechanical transmission by vectors is believed to be the primary method of transmission but direct contact, infected semen and contaminated feed and water sources are also considered as rare but possible routes of transmission (Carn & Kitching, 1995b; Magori-Cohen et al., 2012) . There are many different species that have been implicated as mechanical vectors, such as biting flies (e.g., Stomoxys calcitrans, Yeruham et al. (1995) ), mosquitoes (e.g., Aedes aegypti, Chihota, Rennie, Kitching, and Mellor (2001) ) and ixodid (hard) ticks with evidence for transstadial and transovarial transmission in these ticks (e.g., Rhipicephalus spp., Tuppurainen et al. (2011) ).
There has been rapid geographical spread of LSD over the last 30 years with emergence in south-east Europe for the first time in 2015. Historically, it had been restricted to sub-Saharan Africa and appeared to be in decline, but a resurgence occurred in the 1980s and subsequently it has been steadily spreading northwards (Hunter & Wallace, 2001) . Although there had been infrequent incursions before, since 2006 it has become endemic throughout the Middle East (Tuppurainen & Oura, 2012) . Similarly, it has been present in Turkey since 2013 and is now considered endemic. A few cases of LSD occurred in Greece for the first time during 2015, followed by a widespread outbreak in the Balkan regions in 2016, specifically in Greece, Bulgaria, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo and Albania, as well as in Russia (Mercier et al., 2017) .
These cases and those in 2015 predominantly occurred in the summer months, highlighting the seasonal nature of the disease spread, likely shaped by the environmental requirements of arthropod vectors and pastoralism (Thevenin, 2011) . Given the potential for further spread within the EU, the disease was considered to be a timely case study for the application of our generic framework. Estimation of the risk of initial infection within each EU country would provide information to aid targeted surveillance. In addition, as the disease is notifiable, we anticipated that there would be more data than would be available for nonnotifiable diseases.
We demonstrate our generic framework for spatial quantitative risk assessment for risk of initial infection, specifically due to registered movement of animals or people, by considering the potential import of infected animals in 2016 during the outbreak of LSD in the Balkan region. This is outlined by the following specific risk question: "What is the risk of initial infection of lumpy skin disease in Europe (not including the countries which had notified cases) from legal trade in 2016 due to the presence of lumpy skin disease in the rest of the World?" 2 | METHODS
| The Generic Framework
We define the risk of infection as the probability of one or more initial infections in the native susceptible population in Area B. The risk pathway outlining the probabilistic steps involved in risk of infection for the generic risk question is set out in Figure 1 . Infection can only F I G U R E 1 The five steps of the risk pathway for the generic spatial risk question "What is the risk of infection of a pathogen in Area B due to the presence of that pathogen in Area A?" The term "unit" in Step 1 refers to a generic source of infection such as species, products or feed, provided that they could be in contact with native susceptible hosts occur if there is incursion of infected species, nondetection of that species, the survival of that species and subsequent exposure of native susceptible hosts resulting in transmission, as shown in Figure 1 . We use the term "species" but it could be even more generic than this, such as infected products or feed, provided that they could be in contact with native susceptible hosts. The term "contemporaneous survival" in Figure 1 indicates that some species are only active part of the year (e.g., only summer months in Northern EU countries in the case of vector-borne diseases) and the two species need to coincide for infection to be possible. It also includes the time period over which the infected species is infectious. Thus, animals that are imported directly for slaughter are assumed to have a survival length of 0 days. We combine these steps in the pathway together to produce the probability of one or more infections occurring in Area B for each pathway. Different methods of transmission, different infected species entering Area B or even different pathogen strains require different risk pathways that are then combined together to create the total risk of infection for each location within Area B. Locations at highest overall risk are of most interest to policy makers.
| Risk of Infection
We can mathematically describe and combine the five steps of the risk pathway (Figure 1 ) and can therefore compute a quantitative probability of initial infection at each location thus giving a spatial risk map. This is adapted from a model that assesses the risk of species jumps in avian influenza (Hill et al., 2015) . At first, we describe a single disease pathway from i to j. Inclusion of other pathways resulting in initial infection in Area B from Area A, in which species i and j may be different, is outlined afterwards. As the risk assessment may be calculated on different spatial scales, we use k to denote subregions of Area A and g for locations in Area B. Both of these will be determined by the spatial data available.
Step 1 of the risk of initial infection is the estimation of the number of infected hosts (I k ) entering Area B. Based on the prevalence in Area A k and the total number of hosts exported, the number of infected hosts (I k ) entering location g of Area B during a set time interval is given by:
is the number of hosts imported to or entering location g from Area A k in a unit time interval and p k is the prevalence of infected hosts in Area A k . We use a stochastic representation of the number of imported hosts that will be infected to better describe the potential variability. This requires an assumption of independence and therefore an assumption that infected and noninfected hosts are equally likely to be exported. The number of infected hosts entering location g in Area B from Area A is derived by summing over all subregions in Area A, thus
However, some infected hosts may not make it through import control due to detection of symptoms or testing of hosts, Step 2 in Figure 1 . The probability of detection and the sensitivity of the tests can also vary by location g. We assume, however, that the probability of detection is independent of which country is the exporter. Therefore, we denote p D (g) as the probability of successfully detecting and removing an infected host. The actual number of infected hosts J(g) entering location g in Area B will be given by JðgÞ ∼ BinðIðgÞ; 1 À p D ðgÞÞ
We next calculate Steps 3-5 (Figure 1) , namely the survival rate of the species, the contact rate between hosts and the probability of transmission leading to initial infection of susceptible hosts in each location g of Area B. We combine these components using the basic . Hence, the risk of infection, alternatively the probability of one or more infections occurring in the susceptible population, in location g from introduction of infected hosts from Area A is given by: for each route ω. Therefore, the complete risk of infection over all routes of transmission would become:
This risk of infection calculation is capable of representing different methods of transmission, a wide range of pathogens with different environmental requirements, any spatial scale and any route of introduction.
| Data requirements
The data requirements necessary to calculate the risk of initial infection are presented in Table 1 . The data needs to be on the spatial scale for which the risk assessment is to be performed as well as a suitable time scale. The major determinant of the time scale will be the movement data which could be on a daily, monthly or yearly scale. Data on the quantity of susceptible hosts is not likely to be censored as often but can be assumed to stay relatively constant. Prevalence data can be on any time scale depending on availability, although if different from the time scale of the movement data then assumptions either have to be made that the prevalence is constant over the duration of multiple movements, or on how to split the movement data up to be on the same timescale as the prevalence data.
| Lumpy skin disease case study
We outline the data that we use to compute the risk of infection for our LSD case study ( data which we use for the country and regional risk assessments is the freely available dataset COMEXT, also provided by Eurostat (Eurostat 2017a) , which denotes all trade of any product from any country in the world to any other. We subset the data by product code so that we only include trade in live cattle not for slaughter. 
Using the methodology described in Supporting information

| Prevalence of LSD around the world (P k )
We use 2016 data from the EU-funded SPARE project (Simons et al., 2017) , which estimates prevalence of disease around the world using OIE data on the number of outbreaks and the number of cases per outbreak of the disease in the past 10 years. These data were provided to us in the form of distribution parameters, thus giving a distribution of prevalence of LSD for each country. We use these distributions to represent our uncertainty in the prevalence in 1 year for each country. The data do not assume that a country is free of the disease if it has not notified the OIE of any cases because it takes into account under reporting and the occurrence of notified cases in bordering countries.
| Probability of import detection (p D (g))
Although our locations g can be either countries, regions or even farms, it is unlikely to know the probability of import detection of infected hosts on the finer scales. Even on a country level it may be difficult to determine, especially for diseases which do not have a specific test on import. Therefore, for this case study we set p D (g) = an import detection probability of 0.5 is in a realistic range for LSD.
| Number of susceptible hosts (S(g))
For the country-level assessment of risk, the data is based on cleaned data from the OIE from 2014 which gives the numbers of cattle and farms in each country (World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) 2017). This is to be consistent with the prevalence data which uses OIE data in its methodology. Since OIE data on number of cattle is rare at the regional level, we use data from Eurostat for the numbers of cattle and farms in each region in 2016 (some countries are for 2015 due to the lack of 2016 data) for the regional risk assessment (Eurostat 2017a We do not include differences in the types of farming and husbandry systems that may occur throughout various countries, however, if data is available for LSD or in a different case study, this could be included by changing the underlying formula for R 0 .
| Lumpy Skin Disease data (c, β, r)
There is a great deal of uncertainty over which transmission routes are most important for LSD, the contact rates along those routes, the minimum infective dose required for each route and the probability that the infective dose would be met. Therefore, it would be exceedingly difficult to produce reliable estimates for contact rates (c) and the probability of transmission (β) separately. Instead, we combine the contact rate between animals and probability of trans- (Carn & Kitching, 1995b) we use the upper and lower confidence interval bounds for this parameter in a sensitivity analysis to estimate our uncertainty in the risk calculations due to our uncertainty in transmission rate. We assume that across the whole of Europe there are suitable vectors which are able to transmit LSD virus. This is a fair assumption considering the wide range of species that have been implicated as potential mechanical vectors. The number of days that cattle will exhibit viremia, as well as shedding of virus from nasal, oral and conjunctival secretions, has been estimated to be between 6 and 18 days (Babiuk et al., 2008; Carn & Kitching, 1995a; Tuppurainen, Venter, & Coetzer, 2005) . However, virus has been detected by PCR in skin nodules on cattle up to 42 days post inoculation (Babiuk et al., 2008) and up to 159 days in the semen of experimentally infected bulls (Irons, Tuppurainen, & Venter, 2005) . We assume a 15-day infectious period (r) to represent the shorter viremic period and perform a sensitivity analysis for a 42-day infectious period to incorporate the effects of potential longer skin nodule infectivity.
All of our calculations are performed in R (R Core Team 2016).
We take random draws from the prevalence distribution to estimate the prevalence in each country but reject those samples which fall outside the 5 and 95 quantiles due to long tails of this distribution. This is based on the methodology from the SPARE project which provides the prevalence data. We then randomly draw the number of infected animals entering a country, as described earlier. In total, we use 10,000 iterations. Executing the calculations described earlier, the model outputs a distribution of the risk of infection. To present the results the mean and variance of this distribution are provided. The default scenario considered is a 15-day infectious period, a mechanical transmission rate of 0.026 and no detection on import. Modifications to the default scenario are considered in the sensitivity and scenario analyses and are clearly stated; otherwise it can be assumed that the parameters are those of the default scenario.
| RESULTS
We reiterate here that we define the risk of infection as the probability of one or more initial infections in the native susceptible population in Area B. In nearly all simulations, we find that virtually all locations will have a probability very close to or indistinguishable from 1 if an infected animal is imported to the farm and obviously a probability of 0 if no infected animal is imported. Therefore, each simulation of the risk is essentially a Bernoulli distribution. Combining all the simulations together produces a distribution akin to a scaled Binomial distribution. Hence, the mean and variance of the risk can be interpreted similarly to the mean and variance of a Binomial distribution. The variance is a representation of our total uncertainty arising from the model and input parameters and is only driven by the distribution for prevalence.
The mean annual probability of initial infection per location, at a country-level assessment for the default scenario is plotted in The mean probability of infection due to trade at a regional level also highlights Croatia, Italy and Hungary as countries with the highest risk (Figure 3 ). However, now it is possible to observe that this risk is focussed in specific regions of these countries. Croatia has high risk across the whole country, whereas Italy has highest risk in the northern regions, and in Hungary the highest risks are in the southern part of the country. Similarly, the variance of this risk is plotted on a regional scale. Some countries, for example Romania and Germany, have regions with both low probability of infection and low variance in this probability, as well as other regions which have low mean probability but a higher variance. This allows for better understanding of where to focus surveillance activities. the combination of multiple farms with high risk culminates in more certainty that infection would occur. Hence, the result of many farms with high risk and high uncertainty results in high risk with little uncertainty at a regional or country level.
Risk of initial infection
| Sensitivity analysis
We performed sensitivity analysis on the two main parameters that have uncertainty, the length of the infectious period in cattle (15 or 42 days) and the mechanical (vector) transmission rate (in the range 0.013-0.052). Varying either of these parameters within these values does not make a noticeable difference to the results. The high transmission rates, the ability for hosts to infect any of the susceptible hosts on the farm and the long infectious period, lead to high R 0 values at each location, even when these parameters vary.
| Scenario analysis
A risk assessment at a country level when the import detection probability is increased from 0 to 0.5 for all countries indicates, as expected, a decrease in the overall probability ( Figure 5 ). Although import detection approximately halves the number of imported infected animals, it does not halve the value of risk. This is because in many simulations no infected animals enter due to low prevalence, which will not change when import detection does occur. In general, the values for risk are reduced most for countries with low-to-medium risk with, for example, Germany, the Netherlands, Romania and
Poland reducing their probability of infection by 30%-50%. In contrast, import detection is not as successful for countries with higher risk, with Italy and Croatia only reducing their risk by 13% and 7%
respectively. This is due to high import rates from countries with nonzero prevalence, so that with 50% detection many infected animals could still enter the country.
| DISCUSSION
Our risk assessment was performed at various spatial scales, both to show the flexibility of the framework, and to understand more clearly how LSD risk is distributed across Europe. In comparison to the risk of infection calculation at a regional or country level, the individual level informs whether higher risk arises due to a large number of farms with low-to-medium risk, or due to a small number of farms with high risk. For example, only a few individual farms in Spain import but they have a high risk of LSD, whereas in Italy and Hungary many farms import from countries with nonzero prevalence but they have low to mid risk (Figure 4 ). This is particularly pertinent for Spain, in this case, as at a country level its risk is lower than a few other countries. This could lead to less overall surveillance than those countries when in reality there are a few farms with very high risk. This level of detail is not possible in the regional and countrylevel risk assessment. We reiterate that our regional risk assessment involves the assumption that the distribution of animal imports amongst regions will be similar between the UK and the rest of Europe. Our model for trade distribution (see Supporting information However, vaccination against LSD may not be suitable or recommended for all countries due to the fact it is a live vaccine with no test to distinguish infected from vaccinated cattle (Tuppurainen & Oura, 2012) . As an alternative, increasing the probability of detection on import does reduces the risk from trade imports. However, the effects of import detection are not equivalent across countries, and the countries with highest risks would need higher probabilities of successful detection to be able to reduce their risk by the same proportion. This could significantly reduce the risk estimates in more northerly countries as the transmission rates through direct contact are significantly smaller than through mechanical vector contact (Carn & Kitching, 1995b; Magori-Cohen et al., 2012 (Tuppurainen et al., 2011) , this may be an important transmission pathway to consider for spread of LSD.
The difference in risk for LSD across Europe is primarily driven by prevalence in export countries and the number of cattle imported,
The mean annual risk of infection (a) and the variance of this risk (b) are plotted in shades of purple across Europe, calculated at the individual farm level. Individual farms are only plotted if they trade with a country that has nonzero prevalence. In (c) and (d), the mean and variance, respectively, of the annual risk of infection are again plotted, but zoomed in to the areas outlined by rectangles in (a) and (b). Regions in yellow have negligible risk due to farms within those regions only trading with countries that have zero prevalence, according to our prevalence data. Countries which had notified cases in 2016 are in red. Countries in grey have insufficient data for calculating risk. TRACES trade data is used [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] whereas specific disease parameters and the differences between countries/regions in the average number of susceptible animals on a farm did not have much impact on risk estimates. This finding is expected to be similar for most diseases, although different formulas for R 0 to estimate disease transmission within each area could affect it, especially if the R 0 parameters are dependent on environmental factors, which vary between areas. The lack of consensus on which vectors of LSD are the most influential in spreading the disease (via mechanical transmission) mean that we are not able to vary R 0 with location based on how the vectors respond to environmental variables. Therefore, our LSD case study is not able to include details surrounding a key element of transmission. However, as the difference in risk is primarily driven by the import trade and as the greatest risk is located in countries which are likely to have similar climates to those which had outbreaks in 2016, we believe our results provide a robust estimation of risk across Europe for 2016.
Our generic framework can be adapted for different modes of transmission by changing the formula used for R 0 . This provides flexibility to consider other case studies which involve different transmission pathways, such as vector-borne transmission, environmental and contaminated feed and water sources. Furthermore, the generic framework can also be used for different types of movement in to Area B, such as unregistered movement. Movement of terrestrial wildlife, migratory birds and local and windborne travel of vectors can be included in to the framework through the parameter N k (g) in the same way as the import of animals by trade. The difference is that the estimation of N k (g) will likely be based on a model of animal movement instead of a global database, such as we used for trade in the LSD case study. Similarly, we estimated the number of susceptible animals using databases on the number of animals on farms in each country, but for other pathways a more useful measure could be the number of animals in a 10 km 2 area extracted from density maps of animals, depending on the data used for movement of animals. Importantly, however, the framework itself remains unchanged for these different pathways of disease introduction.
The accuracy of our framework to predict the risk of initial infection for different diseases will depend greatly on the quality and quantity of data available for the disease and relevant animal spe- Figure S2 , in which the risk estimates at a country level are compared using either the Comext dataset or the TRACES dataset, indicating that there are clear differences between these datasets. However, it is not possible to state with any certainty which is the better dataset to use. Similarly, reliable estimates for prevalence of a disease in all countries throughout the world are difficult to obtain. The data we use for prevalence from Simons et al. (2017) is based on OIE notified cases, the best freely available source for worldwide animal disease outbreaks. But it is judicious to remember that the resulting data on prevalence is the result of a model with uncertainty and assumptions. We provide a risk assessment for LSD based on the best available data. Conversely, the generic framework we present is applicable for all data sources and can be reused as better data becomes available.
A major advantage of a framework that promotes the computation of risk at various spatial scales is that it allows for the identification of hotspots of disease, and hence it can guide policy decisions regarding the implementation of more specific and directed surveillance of potential infection. Enhancing surveillance methods has the potential to reduce time to detection of infection thus reducing the likelihood of widespread outbreaks, as well as decreasing the costs of, and time spent, on surveillance. Clearly countries with a range of F I G U R E 5 The percent that mean risk is reduced by when the probability of detection is increased from 0 to 0.5 is plotted in shades of purple across Europe, calculated at the country level. Countries in yellow have negligible risk due to only trading with countries that have zero prevalence, according to our prevalence data. Countries which had notified cases in 2016 are in red. Comext trade data is used [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] low, medium and higher risks should target surveillance within those regions appropriately. On the other hand, countries with low risk may also want to have surveillance in place but this may be too costly to implement across the whole country. In this case, the variance in the risk can provide additional information for directing surveillance. Additionally, the generic framework can also be expanded to include a method for risk of spread from the hotspots of infection. Combining the risk of initial infection with risk of spread would allow the risk assessor to determine not only which locations have highest risk of infection occurring from outside sources but also, of those locations, which are most likely to spread the disease further within Area B. Our generic framework provides a method for the calculation of risk of initial infection for the introduction of any pathogen from any Area A to Area B, and specifically it allows these calculations to be made across many different spatial scales depending on the question in mind and the data available to the risk assessor. This is a powerful tool that can be used to determine not only which diseases are of most concern for different countries, but also where to focus surveillance within countries for different pathogens.
